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Abstract 
There is little doubt that the EU has played a key role within the wider constellation of forces pushing 
several Arab Mediterranean countries on the path of economic reform since the late 1980s. This is 
particularly clear in the case of Egypt, where the EU has been able to differentiate itself from 
international financial institutions and main donors in two crucial respects. On the one hand, it has 
proposed integration through a gradualist approach to economic reforms. On the other hand, within the 
wider process of multiscalar restructuring, the EU has tried to entrench its own model of integration 
through re-regulation in its periphery, promoting EU standards in several key areas ranging from 
agriculture to banking to telecoms. 
Following from these processes, Egypt has been asymmetrically integrated in the EU’s economic 
‘sphere of influence’, a process which in turn has contributed to three fundamental forms of 
differential integration within Egypt. One is most obvious and has a sectorial nature, with some parts 
of the Egyptian economy highly integrated with, and others effectively prevented access to, the EU 
market. The second form of differential integration is socioeconomic, and has seen outward-oriented 
sections of the Egyptian elite capturing most benefits of integration, with the wider population 
shouldering most of its costs. Lastly, differential integration has also had a political dimension, as 
increased access to the Egyptian economy has heightened the stability bias in Brussels, as well as the 
reliance on Mubarak’s ruling elite before the revolution, thereby strengthening the marginalisation of 
opposition groups, both secular and Islamist, and in turn their resentment towards the EU. 
While the sectorial dimension of differential integration was clearly part and parcel of the EU’s 
project, the socioeconomic and political dimensions, though arguably unintended, have made the 
Egyptian public and its elites in the post-Mubarak era much less receptive to the incentives offered 
from Brussels. This is suggested both by the preference Morsi demonstrated for doing business with 
Turkey and Qatar, and by Sisi’s decision to deepen economic ties with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait rather 
than the EU. 
Keywords 
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Introduction* 
The literature on European Union (EU)’s approach towards its Arab Mediterranean neighbours often 
focuses on the tensions and contradictions between promoting democracy and preserving stability in 
the region (Pace et al. 2009; Cavatorta and Pace 2010). The role of the economic pillar, in which the 
EU claims with some reason to have been much more successful, has not received nearly as much 
treatment.
1
 This is partly because most politics and IR scholars have come to accept the economic as 
an autonomous sphere of social action from the political, to which both security and democracy 
belong. But, perhaps more importantly, this is also related to the fact that the EU is usually considered 
as promoting economic reforms which follow very much in the footsteps of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this respect, there is little 
doubt that the EU has played an important role in pushing several Arab Mediterranean countries on the 
path of economic restructuring. There is also little doubt that the form of restructuring promoted is a 
neoliberal one. At the same time, given the large constellation of forces – public and private, local, 
regional and global – these reforms in the developing world, as well as the degree of inevitability 
which this form of integration has taken in the globalisation discourse (Hay 2002), the EU’s 
contribution in this direction is often neglected because of the problems in disaggregating its impact 
from that of other external actors and factors. 
This paper disagrees with this view, and it takes the EU-Egypt relations as a case study to test the 
potential of a scalar-relational approach in shedding light on both sides of this process (Macartney and 
Shields 2011). On the one hand, an approach sensitive to the multiscalar nature of restructuring 
promises to grasp the contribution of EU’s economic reform promotion to the broader neoliberal 
restructuring of the Egyptian economy. On the other hand, as it allows for the relative autonomy of 
different scales, a scalar-relational approach can also highlight the key elements that differentiate the 
EU from other external actors pushing for structural reforms in the Egyptian economy. Indeed, this 
distinctiveness might also provide the EU with the possibility of partially incorporating Egypt as an 
economic borderland (Del Sarto 2010), thus also serving an aim vis-à-vis other major powers with 
strong interests in the region. 
The argument for a scalar-relational approach to the process of multiscalar restructuring that has 
taken place globally since the 1980s is at the heart of the first section. While this shows the EU’s 
alignment with this broad goal, it also identifies its main specificities. Two of them are particularly 
relevant in the context of this paper: gradualism instead of ‘shock therapy’ structural adjustment, and 
re-regulation via institutional reform as the preferred route towards market creation and consolidation. 
The second section shows how these specificities are key in structuring the way in which the EU’s 
economic space only partially incorporates Egypt, making it a borderland. This is illustrated with 
reference to EU’s promotion of its gradualist approach to reform based on re-regulation in the three 
key domains in which the EU has been heavily involved, particularly under the auspices of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): the imposition of strict sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures for Egyptian agricultural exports, the reform of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), and the 
regulation of the newly created telecoms markets through the National Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority (NTRA). The third section looks at how asymmetric integration with the EU and 
the global economy produced three dimensions of differential integration within Egypt: sectorial, 
                                                     
*
 Research for this paper was carried out in the framework of the research project ‘BORDERLANDS: Boundaries, 
Governance, and Power in the European Union’s Relations with North Africa and the Middle East’, funded by the 
European Research Council (ERC) under Grant Agreement Number 263277. The project is directed by Raffaella A. Del 
Sarto and hosted at the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. I would like to 
thank two anonymous referees for their helpful feedback on previous versions of the paper. 
1 For a notable exception, see Holden (2010). 
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socioeconomic, and political. While these are only partly related to Egypt’s unstable position as an EU 
borderland, it is argued here that the EU certainly contributed to differential integration within Egypt, 
and that this helps explain the latter’s relative distancing from the EU itself in the post-Mubarak era. In 
light of these considerations, the final section discusses whether this backlash and the increasing role 
of Gulf capital in Egypt signal the disincorporation of Egypt from the EU, and thus whether the little 
material clout currently exerted by the latter, despite the persisting overlap in regulatory regimes, 
renders the label of EU borderland an inappropriate one. 
The EU’s place in global economic restructuring: scale matters 
The process of global economic restructuring, and its political implications, have for long been at the 
heart of much literature in the field of International Political Economy (IPE). In both its mainstream 
and critical strands, there is a nearly universal consensus that sees the rise of neoliberalism, and the 
attendant economic reforms needed for its success, as the reaction to the global slowdown of the early 
1970s and the ensuing stagflation, which pointed towards the relentless erosion of the ‘embedded 
liberal’ compromise underpinning the Bretton Woods regime (Blyth 2003; Harvey 2005). However, 
following the dismantling of barriers to both trade and capital movements, restructuring along 
neoliberal lines has hardly produced the flattening of the economic space suggested by some of its 
advocates (Ohmae 1991; Friedman 2005). Rather, integration has hardly been uniform both between 
and within countries, and if anything it has further demonstrated the unevenness of capitalist 
development, rather than its supposed equalising effects. This is obviously also related to the 
persisting role of political authorities, located on different scales, which has produced the 
fragmentation of this global process of restructuring, at the same time articulating it with local 
specificities, thus bringing about several variations of the neoliberal template (Cerny 2004; Macartney 
2010; Jessop 2014). 
If unevenness and differentiation remain the rule also, and especially, in times of neoliberal 
restructuring, then it becomes all the more important to develop an approach that adequately accounts 
for the interaction of different spatial scales. Following developments in human geography, Macartney 
and Shields propose a scalar-relational approach which eminently focuses on the process of scaling 
(2011), defined as ‘the production, reconfiguration and contestation of particular differentiations, 
orderings and hierarchies among scales’ (Brenner 2001: 600). According to Jessop (2007: 105), ‘scale 
comprises the nested (and sometimes not so nested) hierarchy of bounded spaces of different size: for 
example, local, regional, continental and global’. In light of the intimate relation between scales 
implied by conceiving them as ‘nested’, this approach appears better suited to account for today’s 
highly interconnected world than the silos approach adopted in the levels-of-analysis tradition. In 
addition to this, the relational side of the process of scaling allows to retain some degree of agency in 
each of the scales, eschewing structural determinism. Thus, according to a scalar-relational approach, 
economic processes such as trade liberalisation are inevitably fragmented but nonetheless present. For 
instance, the WTO would be setting the broad parameters within which such liberalisation occurs in its 
member states, but its specificities are defined locally, and are simultaneously influenced by other 
actors acting transnationally or regionally. Through this approach it is thus possible to account both for 
the general coherence of the process of neoliberal restructuring and for the competitive dynamics that 
it engenders.  
In the context of the EU-Egypt relations, the move towards a scalar-relational approach appears 
promising for three reasons. Firstly, as just mentioned, it provides the possibility of taking into 
adequate account the ways in which tendentially global processes are articulated, refracted, resisted 
and also contested on different spatial scales. Such an approach thus allows us to consider the 
specificities of both the EU’s approach to economic restructuring in its periphery as well as the 
implementation of reforms in these partner countries. Secondly, as highlighted in the quotation above, 
the relational dimension of the approach also applies to how spaces and scales are configured and 
reconfigured, and are thus not to be taken as fixed containers but as themselves the product of 
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interactions. This puts us in a position to assess whether, and to what extent, the EU’s promotion of 
economic reforms in Egypt can be seen as a way of turning Egypt into an EU borderland. Lastly, 
within a scalar-relational approach, spaces and frontiers are not simply redrawn as the result of the 
operation of an allegedly apolitical economic logic, but are instead constituted by and through power 
relations. In the words of Macartney and Shields (2011: 38), ‘[s]pace and scale are neither 
ontologically given nor politically or discursively neutral; space and scale embody power relations’. 
This is an element that is often neglected in the constructivist literature on the diffusion of norms and 
policies, and on a regional scale in the Europeanisation literature.  
Understood in these terms, a scalar-relational approach should steer us away from two opposite 
risks that are visible in the extant literature. On the one hand, as mentioned above, much literature on 
integration assumes that the dissolution of barriers would lead to a homogeneous economic space, 
where resources can be allocated efficiently. Beyond the prima facie objection that here by resources 
one means the many forms of capital, while labour is to be regulated through ever tighter migratory 
policies, this is a process that is at best tendential, and thus provides us with a teleological end point 
rather than with a useful framework for analysis. Focusing on how the creation of specific spaces for 
the easier and more profitable circulation of capital, such as export-processing (EPZs) and special 
economic zones (SEZs), is itself a process that requires differentiation rather than homogeneity, and 
on how the creation of borderlands is a competitive process heavily shaped by power relations, is a 
much more realistic starting point for understanding the forms in which economic restructuring has 
occurred in different times and locales. On the other hand, the opposite risk lies in suggesting that the 
persistence of differences across borders signals the failure of integration. This is an argument that is 
often advanced with reference to the Middle East, with the region lagging dramatically behind in most 
key indicators of integration such as share of global FDI stock and flows and role in global production 
networks (Talani 2014). At the same time, the inability to attract global investments does not 
necessarily stem from a lack of measures favouring integration.
2
 Indeed, scholars increasingly agree 
that neoliberal restructuring has affected most Middle Eastern countries, either through conditionality 
imposed by international financial institutions and donors, or through policies carried out by the local 
ruling elite (Guazzone and Pioppi 2009). A scalar-relational approach should thus put us in the 
position to avoid indulging in the profoundly misleading ‘regional narcissism’ denounced by Fred 
Halliday already a decade ago (2005), allowing us to grasp the dimensions on which economic 
restructuring has occurred, and how and to what extent the EU contributed to it. 
Through a scalar-relational approach it is possible to grasp the specific forms in which the EU has 
promoted economic restructuring both within its member countries and in its neighbourhood, as well 
as the overlap with the actions of other international institutions and donors. We can thus identify the 
EU’s role within a larger trend of multiscalar restructuring, while highlighting its peculiarities. Two of 
them are particularly important. Firstly, compared to the IMF and the World Bank, the EU has 
historically relied on an approach to economic restructuring characterised by gradualism. This can 
perhaps be understood in light of the social crisis in which the ‘shock therapy’ strategy had plunged 
most Central and Eastern European countries already earmarked for EU accession (Kolodko 2000). 
This might have led policy-makers in Brussels towards what was considered a more realistic and 
socially sustainable approach to economic reforms. This had already been tested with respect to the 
direction towards which member states had been steered since the Single European Act, and even 
more so following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty (Ryner 1998). Through the setting of 
criteria and benchmarks, the EU has created the conditions for a gradual harmonisation of laws and 
regulations in most economic spheres (Falkner et al. 2005). A similarly staggered approach, with the 
                                                     
2 Rather, relevant literature in development economics has for instance discussed issues such as first-mover advantage and 
third-party effect (Cornia 2003), which lead latecomers to the process of economic integration to see the conditions of 
their own economy deteriorate further because of the failure of domestic firms to keep up with international competition 
in the local market, as well as their inability to penetrate into foreign markets, already saturated by cheap products from 
developing countries that integrated earlier. 
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periodic monitoring and evaluation of progress in different areas, and with heavy reliance on 
conditionality, has been applied both to candidate countries and to ENP partners, firstly through 
Association Agreements (AA) and then through Action Plans (AP) (Tulmets 2006). 
Secondly, the EU’s promotion of economic restructuring, both within and without, has taken much 
more the form of re-regulation rather than deregulation (Majone 1996; Menz 2003). This approach 
implies a much larger role played by institutions not only in monitoring markets, but to a large extent 
in shaping them. Such an approach has recently been cast as an extension of the highly successful 
ordoliberal model underpinning the German social market economy to the whole EU (Bonefeld 2012). 
The ordoliberal tradition is founded on the assumption that the market order is inherently fragile, and 
in need of a strong political authority for both fostering and protecting the market. This relation 
whereby a strong state is able to shield and guarantee a free market can then also produce socially 
desirable outcomes, as in the German case (Ryner 2003). While this ordoliberal influence has become 
much more apparent in the wake of the Eurozone crisis, it is possible to see the re-regulatory drive 
taking hold within member states since the late 1980s as a milder form of the same process (Gerber 
1998). Interestingly, the attitude towards reform promotion in neighbouring countries, both primed for 
accession and not, appears to follow a similar pattern. In the Egyptian case, this is reflected in the 
implicit division of labour between international financial institutions (IFIs), and more recently the 
World Bank, and the European Union, with the former focusing on sectorial reform and the latter more 
heavily involved in institutional matters, such as for instance the regulation of banking and telecoms 
sectors.
3
 
In sum, the EU’s involvement in promoting economic restructuring in its periphery is selective, 
characterised by gradualism, and with an emphasis on re-regulation via institutional reform rather than 
deregulation tout court. It is not difficult to see how these specificities in the EU approach, particularly 
once articulated with reforms supported by other international organisations and donors, carry a 
significant potential for asymmetries in two different directions. Firstly, the EU’s support in market 
creation through re-regulation means, as we will see in the next section, that the regulations promoted 
are akin to the ones already in place within the EU. In an increasingly global economy driven by the 
imperatives of competitiveness, such an approach allows the EU to establish and entrench an 
advantage against other powers with economic interests in the region. More specifically, it is also 
meant to facilitate the ability for EU-based companies to invest in countries that are not part of the EU, 
but whose regulatory framework increasingly looks like the one these companies face at home. This 
might well be construed as the attempt to establish an economic borderland. Here, it is important to 
distinguish between a more specific and a broader definition of processes of borderland-making, as 
presented by Del Sarto (2010). The former entails ‘the gradual expansion of overlapping regimes and 
functional boundaries’ (ibid: 165), with some of the functions being ‘outsourced’ to neighbouring 
countries. In the more comprehensive definition, the making of a borderland instead ‘connects the 
periphery, in differentiated ways, with the European core as the former absorbs EU rules and legal 
frameworks’ (ibid: 151). The discussion of EU-Egyptian economic relations presented here 
contributes more to this broader understanding of borderland than to the more specific one. 
Secondly, the limited extent of the economic reforms directly supported by the EU risks producing 
a very lopsided integration of the economies of neighbouring countries. For this reason, in its 
empirical section this paper frames this following Halliday’s concept of ‘differential integration’ 
(2002), which provides a way of adopting a scalar-relational approach even with respect to which 
specific areas, sectors and social groups have been more successfully integrated, and which ones less, 
through this decade-long process of making Egypt an EU borderland. The suggestion here is that 
understanding these asymmetries might provide a key for understanding to what degree this process 
might be a reversible one. 
                                                     
3 In this respect, and following Ryner (2015: 281), ordoliberalism is conceived here as ‘a particular variant of 
neoliberalism’. 
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Indeed, the selection of Egypt as the case study for this paper is partly motivated by the unique 
combination of a changed conjuncture both on the national and regional scale, with revolution and 
quick succession of regimes in the former, and sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone hampering EU 
power projection in the latter. This twin instability, combined with Egypt’s sheer size as the largest 
Arab country, has created a window of opportunity for other regional powers. In this respect, Egypt’s 
position as an essentially contested borderland opens up the opportunity for exploring not only its 
partial incorporation within the EU, but also its relative disincorporation from it, as well as the 
pressures towards integration with the Gulf region currently exerted by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait most 
notably.  
Turning Egypt into an EU borderland? Evidence from economic reforms 
After sustained engagement in reforms under the IMF-led Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program (ERSAP), Egypt appeared to be significantly less interested in strengthening its 
ties with the EU, which in turn – after the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) – had 
moved towards making conditionality a binding element in the new round of association agreements. 
Perhaps also for this reason Egypt signed his AA only in 2001, with its entry into force delayed until 
2004. It took a sizeable change in political personnel, with the rise of the self-styled ‘reformist’ wing 
in the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and the appointment of the Nazif cabinet in 2004, to 
render the Egyptian government significantly more receptive to the incentives offered by the EU. 
While not legally binding, the AP concluded under the ENP created the foundations for deepening 
EU-Egypt economic relations, which would now include a much larger number of sectors. 
In order to address the Egyptian case, it is essential to recast some of the specificities of the EU’s 
promotion of economic reforms in its neighbourhood. More specifically, a clarification is needed with 
respect to gradualism. Despite the aim to produce wide-ranging structural reforms through ERSAP, 
the IMF’s approach to reforms in Egypt has de facto been far more gradual than in most other 
developing countries engaged in structural adjustment programmes in the late 1980s and 1990s 
(Momani 2005). The reason for this has largely been found in Egypt’s strategic relevance for the West, 
in both economic and geopolitical terms, which has pushed IFIs to turn a blind eye to the limited 
progress in achieving structural reforms (Amin 1995). However, this should not be read as a 
prolongation of the politics of dilatory reform typical of the 1980s (Richards 1991). Indeed, in the two 
decades between the 1987 IMF agreement and the global financial crisis, the Egyptian economy had 
been thoroughly transformed along neoliberal lines, even though Washington Consensus principles 
were articulated with persisting crony relations between government and private sector. When 
measured in terms of policy outcomes, it is difficult to maintain that the Egyptian economy has not 
been thoroughly neoliberalised: both current and capital account were liberalised (Ikram 2006); the 
dual exchange rate had been eliminated and the Egyptian pound had now reached a competitive rate 
that could boost exports (Economist Intelligence Unit 2003); privatisations had reduced the direct 
presence of the state in the productive sector, touching in the mid-2000s previously off-limits sectors 
such as banks and oil refineries (Richter 2006); tax reforms led to the implementation of a general 
sales tax and a combination of tax breaks and lower corporate tax for businesses (Soliman 2011). 
While fiscal discipline on the part of the government had been intermittent at best, and subsidies still 
weighed heavily on the state budget (Ikram 2006), most other indicators suggested that Egypt had 
clearly moved in a neoliberal direction. 
Regardless of these results, if gradualism was also common to other international donors, the 
dimension of temporal asymmetry between reforms demanded and actual provision of market access 
still characterises the EU’s promotion of economic restructuring in Egypt. However, the main criterion 
for the division of labour between the EU and other main institutions and donors is to be found in the 
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second element outlined earlier: re-regulation via institutional reform.
4
 For this reason, this section 
focuses on three sectors in which the EU played a major role exactly in setting new frameworks for 
regulating specific products and markets: the implementation of much stricter SPS measures in 
agriculture, CBE reform in the banking sector, and the regulation of the fast-developing telecom 
sector.
5
 
Agriculture. The case of market access for Egyptian agricultural products, and the emphasis laid by 
the EU on safety and quality standards, provides an ideal illustration of the workings of gradualism. 
Interestingly enough, following the AA signed in 2001, the EU dismantled its tariffs for agricultural 
products at a much faster pace than the Egyptian government. This was presented as a sign of the EU’s 
willingness to give its partner countries the opportunity to adapt to free trade in agriculture, while 
providing them easier access to the vast EU market. However, contrary to what labour costs and 
comparative advantage would suggest, Egypt did not experience any significant increase in its 
agricultural exports to the EU market (Kourtelis 2014). The explanation for this is twofold. On the one 
hand, the EU decided to keep tariffs on about sixty agricultural items (Colombo and Tocci 2012). On 
the other hand, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on the EU side constituted a major hurdle for Egyptian 
producers. More specifically, following the 1995 WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, the EU had moved towards implementing stringent quality and safety 
controls, which it demanded foreign agricultural producers to respect for their products to enter the EU 
market. As a consequence of this, while agricultural produce from EU countries was by definition 
good enough to be sold on the Egyptian market, most Egyptian producers would not be able to export 
to the EU as they failed to acquire the SPS certifications expected by the EU (Kourtelis 2014).  
The AP set upon itself the task of dealing with NTBs, with the aim of offering a larger stake of the 
EU common market to Egyptian agricultural products. While efforts to establish a national food safety 
authority have so far failed to yield significant results, the EU has managed to gain some autonomy 
from the WTO with respect to the implementation of SPS measures, persuading the Egyptian regulator 
not simply to comply with WTO regulations, but rather to comply by harmonising its own SPS 
controls with the ones carried out in the EU. There is a vast literature discussing the detrimental effects 
on trade of SPS-related regulations for developing countries, particularly in light of their cost-raising 
and supply-discriminating effects (Sykes 1995; Henson and Loader 2001). 
The promotion of more stringent SPS controls, and thus of higher quality and safety standards, was 
presented to Egypt, as well as to other Mediterranean partner countries, as a potential engine of GDP 
growth. The growth of Egypt’s agricultural exports to the EU by an average 4.5% a year between 2009 
and 2013 appears to validate this prediction (European Commission 2014). What these aggregate 
figures fail to show is that only few Egyptian companies have had the resources to comply with EU 
regulations, and thus the benefits of growing exports are highly concentrated towards the largest 
agricultural companies. Developments in this sector following the Arab uprisings suggest that the EU 
does not consider this skewed distribution of costs and benefits a major issue, and indeed the European 
Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD) appears to offer more 
of the same, with first reports suggesting an intensification in the implementation of SPS controls, thus 
further raising export costs out of the reach of small and medium agricultural enterprises (Kourtelis 
2014). 
                                                     
4 This point was particularly well put by Sahar Nasr, then senior financial economist for the World Bank in the Middle 
East and North Africa, in an interview she gave me in one of my first visits to Egypt (Cairo, 20 June 2010). She 
suggested that the EU was ‘doing what it does best’: creating regulatory and institutional capacity.  
5 Whilst of great importance, particularly in the light of the historical state presence in the sector, the manufacturing sector 
is not taken into account in this paper. This is because the effects of trade and price liberalisation on the industrial 
production are difficult to attribute to any specific international organisation promoting these measures. What is 
commonly accepted is that these reforms have produced a widespread de-industrialisation (Abdel-Khalek 2001). 
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Banking. Even more than SPS measures in agriculture, regulatory reforms in the banking sector 
allows us to assess how the EU manages to gain some degree of autonomy within a common template, 
in this case provided by Basel II regulations. This room to manoeuver has been granted to the EU, 
with the direct involvement of the European Central Bank (ECB), with a mandate to steer and 
supervise the re-regulation of the Egyptian banking sector through CBE reform.  
EU support of central bank reform was inserted in a much broader canvas of financial sector 
reforms, led by the World Bank through the extension of three Financial Sector Development Policy 
Loans amounting to $1.5 billion between 2006 and 2010 (World Bank 2010). These loans followed 
the successful efforts by Mahmoud Mohieldin, finance minister since 2004 under the Nazif cabinet, to 
take decisive action towards altering substantially the ownership structure of the Egyptian banking 
sector. This meant incentivising consolidation on the one hand, and on the other hand downsizing 
significantly public ownership. By the end of 2006, 94% of state-owned shares in banks had been 
divested (World Bank 2006: 11, ft. 10). These measures were deemed essential towards increasing 
foreign ownership in the Egyptian banking sector, and indeed opened the way for the privatisation of 
one of the ‘big four’ public sector banks, Bank of Alexandria, in the hands of Intesa-San Paolo, which 
in 2006 acquired 80% of the bank’s equity (Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). 
Within these general transformations of the Egyptian banking sector, the EU was tasked with 
supporting the CBE towards being in a position to implement Basel II regulations by 2011. In this 
direction, the ECB carried out two EU-funded projects, with support from the central banks of seven 
EU member states.
6
 The first project (MEDA I, 2006-08) focused nearly exclusively on capacity-
building missions. The second (MEDA II, 2009-11) supported the CBE in developing an appropriate 
regulatory framework to ensure compliance of the Egyptian banking sector with Basel II regulation 
(European Central Bank 2008). The main challenge in this respect was identified in shifting from a 
compliance-based to a risk-based regulatory regime.
7
 While this seems a highly technical and 
politically neutral move, it represents the EU’s main contribution to entrenching capital account 
openness as a sine qua non in the Egyptian financial sector, creating an environment within which 
high volatility of capital flows is effectively naturalised. Egyptian banks can only react to this state of 
affairs by meeting specific capital adequacy and leverage ratios, with the possibility of capital controls 
disappearing on the horizon (Roccu 2012). 
As in the case of SPS controls, the international body established the end result, leaving up to the 
national regulator the route by which requirements would be met.
8
 It is in this space that the EU has 
managed to maximise its own influence exactly by shaping the path along which the CBE would move 
towards Basel II compliance. Another aspect that obviously factored into the EU’s considerations was 
the attempt of creating a regulatory environment in which EU-based banks would feel comfortable in 
investing and operating. While this was construed as a long-term objective, particularly in the light of 
the strong presence of Gulf-based banks since the 1970s (Ikram 2006), this aim is indicative of the 
EU’s intention of drawing the Egyptian banking sector closer to its own through the increased 
harmonisation of its regulatory regime. The expansion of the circulation of EU-based capital beyond 
its legal boundaries, with its regulation delegated to Egyptian authorities, still broadly along EU 
standards, might well be understood as a process of borderland-making. 
Telecom. The EU’s actions in the newly created telecom sector were more clearly oriented towards 
locking-in the presence of EU-based companies vis-à-vis other potential foreign investors. Despite its 
relatively negligible size, the telecom sector is an interesting case study for three main reasons. Firstly, 
                                                     
6 The central banks selected represented a mix of older and newer EU members, highly and less developed: Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Romania. 
7 Interview with Hervé Leclerc, ECB Resident Programme Coordinator, Cairo, 23 June 2010. 
8 In the case of Basel II, the room for domestic manoeuver was spelled out in the so-called ‘national discretions’ (Central 
Bank of Egypt 2009). 
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being effectively created anew in the mid-1990s, it provides the opportunity of seeing how the EU 
influenced the set-up of a relatively pristine economic sector. Secondly, policy-making in telecom has 
usually had a low degree of politicisation, and given the high degree of advancement of 
telecommunications technologies in Europe, this seems an ideal sector for the EU to maximise the 
influence deriving from its soft power. Thirdly, this is a sector in which there is no overarching 
international organisation setting benchmarks to be met, and this leaves much more scope for 
autonomous action. Unsurprisingly, even in this case the EU’s efforts were focused on assisting the 
Egyptian government in the creation of a regulatory framework under the NTRA. 
Since the turn of the century, the EU has been engaging national telecom regulators in the MENA 
region through the three phases of the New Approach to Telecommunications Policy (NATP) 
programme. The aim of the project is to assist regulatory authorities in the various phases of 
liberalisation of their telecom market, particularly in the field of the policies, institutes and tools for 
regulation, with the long-term objective of increasing convergence between the regulatory approach of 
the participating countries and the EU. This process was enhanced by the signing of twinning 
programmes, with officials from member countries’ telecom regulators spending time at NTRA and 
with Egyptian officials doing the same in EU member states (Frontier Economics 2007). The NTRA 
itself appears to share the goal of harmonisation, stating that institutional twinning enhances its 
‘capacity as telecom regulator through legislative approximation with EU Regulatory bodies and 
through the application of EU best practices that is [sic] best suited to the Egyptian context’. This 
decision of taking EU regulators as the benchmark for measuring regulatory progress in Egypt was 
justified with reference to the fact that ‘a large number of European countries went through similar 
experiences of having to deal with liberalizing telecom sectors dominated by monopolies without 
endangering the social aspects of compromising consumer concerns’.9 In a more prosaic form, the EU 
delegation official following telecom regulatory cooperation claimed that the EU’s goal was ‘to attract 
as much EU investment in the sector as possible’, to the point of suggesting that ideally he would want 
NTRA to ‘copy and paste’ EU regulation, so as to provide a business environment as close as possible 
to the one the EU-based telecom giants face at home.
10
 The strong presence of Orange and Vodafone, 
respectively within MobiNil and Vodafone Egypt, in the booming Egyptian mobile market was 
presented as evidence of how EU-based companies feel increasingly comfortable investing in the 
Egyptian telecom market. 
The EU has managed to significantly shape regulations in all these three sectors, effectively 
shaping a regulatory environment much closer to its own than it might have been otherwise. In the 
economic realm, the Egyptian government is not asked to implement much on behalf of the EU, as it 
happens for instance with migratory regimes, where the EU is ‘in fact expanding its variable border 
geometry to its immediate periphery’ (Del Sarto 2010: 150). However, what we have outlined is 
undoubtedly a process that ‘enables the EU to permeate its periphery in a differentiated manner, exert 
control over the latter, and advance the economic and political interests of the Union and its member 
states’ (Ibid.: 165). It is thus not inaccurate to see this limited incorporation of the Egyptian economy 
as an attempt to establish an EU borderland on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. 
A scalar-relational approach would suggest two qualifications that might to a degree question the 
success of this process of borderland-making. On the one hand, this process of harmonisation is far 
from uniform, and indeed we have seen how only in the telecoms sector the EU really had its hands 
entirely untied in trying to bring Egyptian regulation closer to its own. In agriculture and banking, 
WTO and Basel II regulations respectively narrowed the scope of EU’s influence. Given the strong 
emphasis on liberalisation, of trade and capital account respectively, at the heart of WTO and Basel II 
regulations, one could thus suggest that the attempt of turning Egypt into an economic borderland is 
                                                     
9 Both quotes from: http://www.tra.gov.eg/english/DPages_DPagesDetails.asp?ID=144&Menu=7 (first access 
16 January 2015). 
10 Interview with the Deputy Head of the Environment and Technology Section, EU Delegation in Egypt, 15 June 2010.  
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limited by the open nature of the international economic system, which thus creates the scope for 
newly created borderlands to be contested, and potentially also deconstructed and reconstructed in 
different directions. On the other hand, but related to the point just made, one must avoid conflating 
regulatory harmonisation with the material effects this has in terms of serving the interests of the EU, 
its members states and/or some of their companies. In this respect too there is a degree of variation 
that must be taken into account. For instance, SPS controls as a sophisticated NTB have certainly 
hampered the ability of Egyptian farmers to gain real access to the EU market, allowing EU-based 
producers to protect their own position. Similarly, NTRA regulations protect the position that 
Vodafone and Orange have gained in the Egyptian mobile market. However, the same discourse does 
not apply to banking, which is to this day still dominated by the remaining public sector banks and by 
Gulf banks, with HSBC, Barclays and Intesa San Paolo among the few EU-based banks entering the 
market successfully. This element can be understood as a clash between two processes of region-
making, one led by the EU and the other by Gulf capital and the monarchies representing it (Hanieh 
2011). 
These qualifications only add weight to the argument made earlier that the integration of the 
Egyptian with the EU economy one is a highly partial and asymmetric one. Partly because of this very 
partiality and asymmetry, it was also significantly more fragile than EU officials and representatives 
were inclined to think. The 2011 revolution and its long aftermath have exposed the two most 
important dimensions of this fragility. On the one hand, asymmetric integration with the EU economy 
contributed significantly to Egypt’s asymmetric integration in the world economy. In turn, this is 
essential for understanding the dimensions of differential integration within Egypt. On the other hand, 
the reaction of other regional powers to the revolution itself, and the change in attitude of successive 
Egyptian regimes towards the EU, have also pointed towards the potential reversibility of Egypt’s 
position as an EU borderland. It is on these elements that we turn our attention in the next two 
sections. 
From asymmetric integration between to differential integration within 
Three dimensions of differential integration within Egypt are of particular relevance here, as they are 
essential for understanding both the destabilising potential of asymmetric integration between 
economies and the setback experienced by the EU in the preferences of Egyptian regimes post-
Mubarak. Firstly, in sectorial terms, Egypt’s real economy was more integrated than its financial 
sector. Secondly, in socioeconomic terms, outward-oriented sections of the Egyptian elite captured 
most of the benefits of integration, while its costs were shouldered particularly by middle- and low-
income Egyptians. Lastly, in political terms, the interconnections resulting from integration, however 
partial, had increased the EU’s reliance on the incumbent regime, seen as the domestic driver of that 
integration, to the expense of increasingly marginalised opposition groups. 
A caveat is in order here. While the political dimension of differential integration, with its attendant 
stability bias, was a more general problem affecting Western elites and IOs alike, it is still possible to 
evaluate the EU’s role in its right. On the other two dimensions, there are no intentions of claiming 
that the EU caused differential integration, or even that it was its main architect. Such argument would 
be difficult to substantiate in the light of available evidence. It is nonetheless possible to advance a less 
daring argument, and suggest that the EU contributed to these different dimensions of differential 
integration. This is one of the advantages of the scalar-relational approach proposed here, which brings 
to light the relative autonomy enjoyed by the EU when promoting specific economic reforms in Egypt, 
showing both its degree of differentiation from other IOs and donors, on which we have hitherto 
focused, and its contribution to the broader project of neoliberal restructuring.
11
 
                                                     
11 It is clear that the flipside of such radically relational approach is a degree of indeterminacy with respect to theoretical 
predictions. However, this tension can be teased out by looking at developments on the ground on a case-by-case basis. 
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It is difficult to contend that the EU’s contribution to the sectorial dimension of differential 
integration was an unintended one. Unless one is clouded by lofty considerations on ‘normative 
power’, it is only to be expected that a strong international actor would push for integration in sectors 
where it has to benefit from market access, while it will try to slow down or prevent altogether 
integration in those markets in which protection is in its own interest, as discussed above. An aspect 
which instead we have not touched upon yet, as it can be seen only by looking at Egypt’s integration 
in the global economy, is that external factors, in the form of greater penetration of foreign capital but 
also of greater competition from foreign goods, have affected much more the real economy compared 
to the financial sector. Successive trade and price liberalisations and privatisations significantly 
limited the ways in which the government could affect manufacturing, while some of the tools still 
available would often have an opposite effect to the one intended.
12
 As a consequence, Egyptians 
working in agriculture and manufacturing found themselves exposed to the volatility of global markets 
much more than investors in the booming but still relatively underdeveloped financial sector. This 
point is further witnessed by the resilience demonstrated by the Egyptian financial sector in the wake 
of the global financial crisis,
13
 while the same cannot be said with respect to the effects of the global 
food crisis and the great recession. 
The socioeconomic dimension of differential integration is arguably the most important for 
understanding the upheavals leading to Mubarak’s overthrow. The neoliberal turn, particularly in the 
articulations promoted by the rising predatory oligarchy, produced a constant increase in economic 
inequality, and at a much accelerated pace since 2004 (Amin 2011). Such inequality was largely 
produced by the uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of reforms. On the one hand, the group 
of businessmen-cum-politicians around Gamal Mubarak were the embodiment of the new partnership 
between large domestic and foreign capital. On the other hand, the success of this partnership largely 
occurred at the expense of small and medium enterprises, leading to the pauperisation of the middle 
class, the decline in living standards for industrial workers and peasants, and the further swelling of 
the ranks of the urban informal proletariat (Roccu 2013). The EU certainly played a part in this 
process. In agriculture, for instance, the combination of state withdrawal and ever more expensive 
certifications for exporting to the EU constituted a threshold that effectively ruled out the vast majority 
of farmers, as ‘[t]hese costs could only be tolerated by large-scale farmers, who not only had the funds 
to apply the standards, but [have] also created networks or their own packing houses to export to the 
EU’ (Kourtelis 2014: 194). Thus, the EU has certainly contributed to reinforce the dual nature of the 
Egyptian agricultural sector, with the sector being increasingly dominated by a small number of 
export-led companies, while the majority of producers have become engaged in what appears more 
like subsistence farming (Bush 2007). In the financial sector, the most acute problems were presented 
by limited access to finance,
14
 which had a lot more to do with World Bank-funded financial sector 
reforms than with the EU support in implementing Basel II regulations. The overall outcome of these 
processes was increasing real and perceived inequality, which in fact accounts for two of the three key 
terms in the now famed revolutionary slogan ‘bread, freedom, and social justice’. 
The political dimension of differential integration saw the EU taking increasingly diverging 
positions vis-à-vis the key Egyptian political actors, increasingly integrating the incumbent political 
and economic elite while accepting its crackdown on major oppositional forces (Youngs 2014). 
Through this process, the EU was becoming increasingly tied to a political and economic elite that was 
held in high regard by the international community because of its reform efforts, while being 
increasingly despised at home because of the outcomes of those very reforms. This in turn had 
alienated to the EU the sympathies of opposition groups, particularly of Islamist orientation, as it kept 
                                                     
12 Cook’s discussion of the role of subsidies in the bread shortages of May 2008 is exemplary in this respect (2012: 177-8). 
13 Interview with Mahmoud Mohieldin, then minister of investment, Cairo, 10 July 2010. 
14 In 2006, for instance, about 51% of total credit extended to the private sector went to 0.19% of clients (World Bank 2008: 
26). According to Osman (2010: 115-6), thirty corporations accounted for 40% of the country’s credit supply. 
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supporting a deeply authoritarian regime because it was following friendly economic and foreign 
policies (Pinfari 2013). The ambivalence of the EU’s immediate reactions to widespread 
demonstrations was unlikely to win back any support from the protesting masses (Driss 2012), and in 
fact created an atmosphere that made it difficult for post-Mubarak regimes to engage with the EU in as 
open and collaborative a way as it had happened in the final years of the previous regime. 
Beware what you push for: an inevitable backlash? 
While the sectorial dimension of differential integration was clearly part and parcel of the EU’s project 
of limited integration, the socioeconomic and political dimensions, while possibly unintended, made 
the Egyptian public and its new governments much less receptive to the incentives offered from 
Brussels. The contribution of both intended and unintended forms of asymmetric integration to 
limiting the EU’s impact in Egypt is at the heart of this section, which also looks at how other regional 
powers, notably Turkey and Qatar under Morsi, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait under Sisi, have tried to 
increase their own influence exploiting the instability following the revolution. The discussion of these 
two elements should allow us to assess to what extent recent developments have undone Egypt’s 
position as an EU borderland. 
The sectorial dimension of differential integration has been constructed as a new form of 
exploitation in both neo-Nasserist and Islamist circles. This should not come too much as a surprise, 
given that despite the neoliberal turn, the language of economic nationalism still holds sway in Egypt, 
and particularly so in the public discourse, where foreign conspiracies are always the source of the 
country’s problems.15 However, despite the new virulence of the nationalist rhetoric in post-
revolutionary Egypt, its very resilience suggests that it is not here that we should be looking for an 
explanation of the increasing estrangement from the EU. The arguably unintended dimensions of 
differential integration might provide a more fruitful starting point in this respect. 
 On the one hand, the stability bias implied by the political dimension of differential integration 
was particularly problematic as it led the EU to engage insufficiently with political opposition, secular 
and Islamist alike, and their civil society organisations. For the same reason, the EU was seen as 
privileging economic access to Egyptian markets, and the stability required by functioning markets, 
while tolerating the increasingly repressive tendencies of authoritarian rule. In light of the hesitations 
displayed by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton during the first days of protests, also the 
support provided to the revolution was largely perceived as a form of late bandwagoning once it had 
become impossible to prop up the old ally (Durac 2013). 
On the other hand, the rampant inequality produced by the neoliberal turn, and the EU contribution 
to the latter, meant that the EU was largely perceived as one of the crutches supporting a regime that 
was increasing unpopular among its own population. This little sympathy that the EU inspired in 
Egyptian society at large was not so much a problem in itself as long as political and economic elites 
were thought to be on board in the process of economic restructuring and partial integration with the 
EU. At the same time, EU policy-makers appeared to be trapped in a view – not uncommon within EU 
member states undergoing structural reforms – that saw increased inequality as a signal of weakening 
state control over the economy and thus of increasing opportunities.
16
  
One might be inclined to suggest that neither of the two points above necessarily entails long-term 
implications. Indeed, one would expect that a reality check would limit the consequences on EU-
Egyptian relations of the former’s double-speak. Additionally, the central position that the army has 
taken again since Morsi’s overthrow in July 2013 might suggest a return to elite-centric politics in 
Egypt, and this might create an environment that would enable the EU to increase once more its 
                                                     
15 In a very interesting book, Gray (2010) suggests that this is a feature common to the Arab world as a whole. 
16 Interview with EU delegation official in Egypt, Cairo, 21 June 2010. 
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leverage. However, these considerations are informed by a highly misleading ceteris paribus 
assumption, neglecting that over the past four years matters have changed drastically in Egypt, in the 
Middle East, but also in the EU. 
To begin from the latter, the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has been suggested to impair the 
EU’s ability to project its power, both material and ideational, in the near abroad. Similar 
circumstances in the US, combined with the decision by the Obama administration to ‘pivot to Asia’, 
have contributed to creating a power vacuum in the Middle East (Lynch 2013). This has in turn 
bolstered the regional ambitions of middle powers that did not experience as severe a crisis as the 
North Atlantic partners. Within this changing global and regional configuration, because of its sheer 
size and untapped economic potential, Egypt clearly offers a much coveted prize. This explains the 
efforts made first by Turkey and Qatar under Morsi (Tabaar 2013; Ayata 2015), and more recently by 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait under Sisi,
17
 to bring Egypt under their respective orbit. 
A changed scenario demands a changed approach, one might be led to think. The EU appears to 
have instead chosen to deepen the same approach, basing its re-engagement on ‘the acceleration of 
existing policies which focus on market access and liberalisation’ (Teti 2012: 277). Colombo and 
Tocci have similarly suggested that the 2011 Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Democracy and the 
proposal of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area amount to little more than ‘old wine in new 
bottles’ (2012). Most importantly, the new slogan of ‘more for more’ with respect to conditionality 
clashes with a significantly transformed scenario, within which the post-Mubarak regimes can rely on 
forms of aid, funding and loans with very few strings attached. The scaling up of funding through 
existing programmes is unlikely to provide the EU with greater leverage vis-à-vis the Egyptian elites, 
at least in the short term (Pinfari 2013). Despite pledges to forge much stronger and broader links with 
civil society, the EU’s vocal but toothless reaction to the blatant human rights violations of the Raba’a 
massacre was unlikely to win many sympathies in any section of civil society not already organic to 
the new regime. Under these circumstances, it becomes difficult to disagree with those scholars 
suggesting that the Arab uprisings have to this date been a failed opportunity for the EU to revise its 
approach to economic reform and democracy promotion in the Arab world (Michou et al. 2014). 
Does this suggest that the Egypt’s position as an EU borderland is inevitably unravelling? As it 
pays attention to the multiform and multiscalar nature of integration, a scalar-relational approach 
suggests us to consider such an argument somewhat premature, as it was premature to hail as 
successful the EU’s approach to reform promotion before the revolution. After all, the carrot of 
veritable access to the EU’s agricultural market is a large one, particularly if the EU moves away from 
the tendency to use safety, quality and hygiene standards as a way of limiting Egyptian exports. At the 
same time, if domestic, regional and global trends have weakened the EU’s pulling power, one can 
then at least envisage the possibility of Egypt as a floating borderland, more loosely tied to the EU 
orbit while still influenced by its regulatory standards in many key economic sectors. Nonetheless, 
despite the enduring appeal of being the largest common market in the world, and one just around the 
corner for Arab Mediterranean countries, recent developments suggest that the EU’s ability to draw 
neighbouring countries in its own orbit as borderlands is not an irreversible one. This is even more so 
in the light of the inconsistencies and double standards that the very borderland approach exposes the 
EU to, making a backlash and the shift towards alternative power centres always a possibility. 
                                                     
17 Apparently also through the use of off-balance sheet transactions directly into the army’s coffers, thus bypassing the 
CBE, according to a recent Guardian report: 
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/sisileaks-egypt-watergate-abdel-fatah-al-sisi (first access 
on 5 March 2015). 
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Conclusion 
This paper has brought to light both the EU’s contribution to the broader process of neoliberal 
restructuring of the Egyptian economy, as well as its specificities. In this respect, the scalar-relational 
approach proposed here provides an analytical depth that takes into adequate account the complexity 
of EU-Egypt relations. Among the distinctive elements of EU’s approach to economic reforms, we 
have seen how agricultural reforms have produced asymmetric market integration, with few Egyptian 
producers being able to overcome the remaining barriers to trade, as the EU has managed to carve 
some degree of autonomy in advising Egypt on how to implement WTO regulations. The second 
peculiar instrument of EU’s reform promotion, re-regulation via institutional reform, has taken greater 
prominence in central bank reform and in the regulation of the newly created telecoms market. While 
in the former case this influence on the regulatory framework has not translated into substantial 
material presence of EU-based banks in Egypt, in the case of telecoms EU’s efforts at moulding 
regulations were very much oriented towards entrenching the strong position developed by Vodafone 
and Orange since the late 1990s. Thus, if seen in terms of accessing new markets and protecting its 
own, the EU’s promotion of economic reforms in Egypt has been generally successful, although to a 
varying degree in different sectors. 
More generally, the EU has managed to develop a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other external 
actors with an economic interest in Egypt. Through the promotion of regulatory frameworks along the 
lines of the ones already in place in its member states, the EU has fostered a form of asymmetric 
integration with the Egyptian economy. In this respect, it is not out of place to speak of Egypt as an 
EU economic borderland. The empirical discussion has also provided two important qualifications to 
this point. Firstly, borderland is understood here in a somewhat weaker sense than in other sectors 
such as migration, where the EU has effectively outsourced some of its monitoring and patrolling 
functions to Southern Mediterranean governments. In the economy we are instead talking mostly of a 
regulatory convergence, which in many occasions might serve the EU’s interests, but not necessarily 
so. Secondly, even in the moments of highest convergence, with the business-friendly Nazif 
government implementing economic reforms at a pace unseen before, Egypt was always a contested 
borderland, and the extent to which integration would continue was strongly dependent on the interests 
of the incumbent political and economic elites. 
Thus, if Egypt was an EU borderland in economic terms, it was always a fragile and contested one, 
and indeed the asymmetric integration promoted by the EU contributed to deepen this fragility by 
creating ever wider sectorial, socioeconomic and political fractures within Egypt. All these dimensions 
of differential integration belied the apparent stability of the Mubarak regime, which was to be 
dispelled by the 2011 revolution. In addition to transformations within Egypt, regional and global 
events have recently modified the general trajectory and outlook of the Egyptian economy and the 
competition that the EU faces from other regional powers. This suggests that the convergence and 
overlap in regulatory frameworks has not necessarily translated into long-lasting real influence on the 
Egyptian economy. Indeed, the increasing presence of Gulf capital suggests that if Egypt still is an 
economic borderland, it is even more than in the past a contested one, and one on which the EU can 
exert much less leverage than it did in the previous decade. 
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